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      he U.S. policy on the South China Sea (SCS) has remained consistent 
since its initial formulation in 1995 through today. 
 
U.S. SCS Policy (1995). 
Concerned that a pattern 
of unilateral actions and re-
actions in the South China 
Sea had increased regional 
tensions, the Department 
of State announced a new 
U.S. Policy on Spratly Islands 
and South China Sea on May 
10, 1995. Four pillars 
served as the basis for the 
policy. 
 
U.S. Position on Mari-
time Claims in the SCS 
(2020). In response to 
continued Chinese malign 
behavior in the SCS, Secre-
tary of State Michael Pom-
peo announced on July 13, 
2020, that the United 
States was strengthening 
its policy in the SCS to 
make clear to China that its 
“claims to offshore resources across most of the SCS are completely unlaw-
ful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them.”1 The reinvigorated policy 
seeks “to preserve peace and stability, uphold freedom of the seas in a man-
ner consistent with international law, maintain the unimpeded flow of com-
merce, and oppose any attempt to use coercion or force to settle disputes.”2 
The new policy highlights that the rules-based international order has 
come under an “unprecedented threat” from China.3 In particular, China has 
used “intimidation to undermine the sovereign [resource] rights of Southeast 
Asian coastal states in the . . . [SCS], bully them out of offshore resources, 
 
 
U.S. Policy on the South China Sea: 
The Four Pillars (1995) 
 
(1) Oppose the use or threat of force to resolve 
competing claims. 
 
(2) Intensify diplomatic efforts to resolve the 
competing claims, taking into account the inter-
ests of all parties, and contribute to peace and 
prosperity in the region. 
 
(3) Maintain freedom of navigation by all ships 
and aircraft in the South China Sea. 
 
(4) Take no position on the legal merits of the 
competing claims to sovereignty over the vari-
ous features in the South China Sea but view 
with serious concern any maritime claim or re-
striction on maritime activity in the South 
China Sea that is inconsistent with international 











assert unilateral dominion, and replace international law with ‘might makes 
right.’”4 
The U.S. position recalls that an Arbitral Tribunal, constituted under An-
nex VII of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, decided unanimously on 
July 12, 2016 that China’s maritime claims in the SCS, including the Nine-
Dashed Line, have no basis in international law.5 The new policy reiterates 
that the Tribunal’s decision is final and legally binding on the Philippines and 
China, and indicates that the United States aligns its position on China’s mar-
itime claims in the SCS with the Tribunal’s decision.6 
 
U.S. Position on China’s Maritime Claims in the SCS (2020). The 
United States takes the following positions on China’s SCS maritime claims. 
 
1. The PRC cannot lawfully assert maritime claims derived from Scar-
borough Reef and the Spratly Islands, including an Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ), “vis-à-vis the 
Philippines in areas that the 
Tribunal found to be in the 
Philippines’ EEZ or on its con-
tinental shelf.”7 
2. China’s “harassment of Philip-
pine fisheries and offshore en-
ergy development within those 
areas is unlawful, as are any uni-
lateral Chinese actions to ex-
ploit those resources.”8 
3. China “has no lawful territorial 
or maritime claims to Mischief 
Reef or Second Thomas Shoal, both of which fall fully under the Philip-
pines’ sovereign rights and jurisdiction,” nor may China generate any ter-
ritorial or maritime claims from these features.9 
4. The United States rejects any Chinese “claims to waters beyond a 12-
nautical mile (nm) territorial sea derived from islands it claims in the 
Spratly Islands (without prejudice to other states’ sovereignty claims over 
such islands).”10  
5. The United States rejects any Chinese “maritime claims in the waters 
surrounding Vanguard Bank (off Vietnam), Luconia Shoals (off Malay-











6. Any Chinese “action to harass other states’ fishing or hydrocarbon de-
velopment in these waters, or to carry out such activities unilaterally, is 
unlawful.”12 
7. China has no lawful territorial or maritime claims to James Shoal, a sub-
merged feature 50 nm from Malaysia. “An underwater feature like James 
Shoal cannot be claimed by any state and is incapable of generating mar-
itime zones.”13 
8. James Shoal “is not and never was Chinese territory, nor can China assert 
any lawful maritime rights from it.”14 
9. The United States stands with its “Southeast Asian allies and partners in 
protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with 
their rights and obligations under international law.”15 
 
Status Quo on Territorial Sovereignty Claims. The new policy aligns the 
U.S. position with the Tribunal’s rulings regarding China’s maritime claims. 
It does not affect the U.S. position on SCS territorial claims reflected in the 
Fourth Pillar of the 1995 policy statement other than to clarify that sover-
eignty claims may only be asserted over high-tide features. China may not 
claim sovereignty over low-tide elevations, such as Mischief Reef and Second 
Thomas Shoal, or totally submerged features, like James Shoal, which are 
located within the EEZ or continental shelf of another nation.16 
The 2020 position reinforces the First Pillar of the 1995 policy by op-
posing China’s use or force to settle disputes and to impose “might makes 
right” in the SCS or in the wider region. Finally, the new policy reiterates the 
long-standing U.S. position, reflected in the Third Pillar of the 1995 policy, 
that the United States will stand with the international community to defend 
“freedom of the seas and respect for sovereignty . . . in the SCS.” 
Two days after the U.S. statement was released, Secretary Pompeo reit-
erated the need to intensify diplomatic efforts to resolve the competing 
claims in the SCS. Consistent with the Second Pillar of the 1995 policy, Pom-
peo indicated that the United States would “support countries all across the 
world who recognize that China has violated their legal territorial [and mar-
itime] claims.”17 Specifically, he stated that the United States would provide 
States assistance using all the tools at its disposal, “whether that’s in multi-
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